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When Richard Nixon assumed the American Presidency in 1969, he inherited a greatly 
weakened foreign policy. The faltering American war effort in Vietnam, combined with the onset
of Soviet nuclear parity, had done significant damage to the country’s ability to project power 
during the Cold War. To continue the American policy of containment towards the Soviet Union, 
Nixon implemented a policy known as detente, or a loosening of tensions between the two 
superpowers. Through detente, the Nixon Administration sought to advance the prospect of 
“habits of mutual restraint, coexistence, and ultimately, cooperation.”1 Beneath the overtures to 
peace with the Soviet Union was a subtle capitulation to the fact that the United States could no 
longer meet the Cold War head-on. Instead, policymakers like Nixon would have to rely on more
subtle levers of American power to contain the Soviets. In his grand strategy, Nixon aimed to 
create what historian John Lewis Gaddis retroactively called “multipolar equilibrium,” meaning 
the United States would seek to reinforce power blocs which remained outside the US and USSR
spheres of influence.2 Stemming from this, Nixon sought to counter Soviet influence by 
bolstering American relations with independent communist regimes such as Romania and the 
People’s Republic of China. Partnership with communist regimes like those mentioned were to 
be evaluated on a case by case basis, no longer dismissed on ideological grounds alone. This was
a far cry from Nixon’s earlier position on international communism, which characterized the 
ideology as monolithic, and thus, tonly solution to it was “a massive offensive for freedom.”3 
One of Nixon’s early overtures towards independent communist states was his policy 
towards the regime of Josip Broz Tito in Yugoslavia. Being that the country was a staunchly 
independent, non-Soviet, socialist regime in the Balkans, Nixon aimed to prop up the country as 
1  Henry Kissinger quoted in John Lewis. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American 
National Security Policy during the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 208.
2 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 208.
3 “Richard Nixon on Communism and Khruschev,” Richard Nixon, Victoria Schuck Political Film Collection, John 
F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA.
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a shield against Soviet aggression in the region. From 1970 to 1974, the Nixon administration 
provided aid to Yugoslavia, seeking to protect the country’s neutrality in the Cold War and its 
independence from the Soviet Bloc while it was undergoing a period of upheaval related to its 
economy and political structure. Nixon, the original Cold Warrior, had changed along with the 
times. Rather than accept the epistemological division of the world between ‘free’ and 
‘communist,’ Nixon sought to build a partnership with Yugoslavia around the shared interest of 
keeping Soviet influence out of the Balkans. Indeed, the Nixon Administration was not 
attempting to pull Yugoslavia into an American sphere of influence, rather, it sought to reinforce  
Yugoslavia’s position as a non-aligned nation. Recognition of an international ‘third way’ 
between the Western alliance and the Eastern bloc was thus a major innovation in Nixon’s 
dealings with Yugoslavia. 
Historiography
Scholarship regarding Nixon’s foreign policy towards Yugoslavia has been relatively 
scant, despite the subject providing insight into how the Nixon Administration dealt with 
communist regimes. One of the few monographs which addresses Nixon’s Yugoslav policy in 
great detail is “United States-Yugoslav Relations, 1961-80: The Twilight Of Tito’s Era And The 
Role Of Ambassadorial Diplomacy In The Making Of  America's Yugoslav Policy” by Josip 
Mocnik. While the study addresses Nixon’s foreign policy towards Yugoslavia, the subject is 
hardly the focus of the dissertation, given its length. Moreover, Mocnik’s assertion that during 
the Nixon years “high-level visits...paradoxically marked the declining bilateral relations” is 
disputable, considering the high amounts of economic aid the Nixon administration provided the 
country.4 While certainly prone to troubles, US-Yugoslav relations under Nixon were hardly in 
4 Josip Mocnik, “United States-Yugoslav Relations, 1961-80: The Twilight Of Tito’s Era And The Role Of 
Ambassadorial Diplomacy In The Making Of  America's Yugoslav Policy,” (Bowling Green University: 2008), 174.
3
Kent: Banking On Belgrade: Nixon’s Foreign Aid Policy With Yugoslavia (1970-1974)
Published by Chapman University Digital Commons, 2020
4
decline when examined in context. The focus of this study, then, is to show that economic aid 
was one of the major ways through which Nixon cultivated positive relations with Yugoslavia, 
and how this policy represented a significant shift in American Cold War policy.
With the relative absence of scholarship on US-Yugoslav relations during the Nixon era, 
it is important to draw attention to the scholarship that has examined Nixon’s foreign policy 
framework writ large. In doing so, it becomes clear that Nixon’s diplomacy with Yugoslavia fit 
neatly with how his administration regularly conducted foreign policy.
Firstly, historians highlight that Nixon dealt with many communist regimes 
pragmatically, making ideological divisions secondary to enhancing mutual goals. In this regard, 
Nixon’s innovation was “identifying the enemy to be contained not as communism, but rather the
Soviet Union, defined as a traditionally expansionist nation-state ,” according to Norman 
Podhoretz.5  Historians Lee Edwards and Elizabeth Spalding echo this assertion, writing that 
Nixon believed “America could work even with communist countries as long as they promoted 
global stability, the new core of U.S. foreign policy.”6 The Brezhnev Doctrine- which asserted 
the Soviet Union’s right to intervene in the politics of other communist states militarily- 
inadvertently helped further Nixon’s goal of exploiting fractures in international communism. 
Supporting independent communist regimes like Yugoslavia would help “exacerbate Soviet 
defense problems by enhancing the worldwide opposition to Soviet expansion in general,” 
diplomacyRobert Sutter states.7 John Lewis Gaddis writes that this line of thinking was very 
much in line with that of early Cold War strategist George Kennan. In Containing the Soviet 
5 Norman Podhoretz, “The Rise and Fall of Containment” in Containing the Soviet Union, (Lincoln: Potomac 
Books, 1987), 219.
6 Lee Edwards and Elizabeth Spalding, A Brief History of the Cold War, (Washington: Regnery History Publishing, 
2016), 131.
7  Robert Sutter, China and the Third World- Strategic and Economic Imperatives and China’s Third World Policy, 
(Foggy Bottom: George Washington University Press, 1999), 15.
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Union, Gaddis writes that “where communists were not under Moscow’s control, as was clearly 
the case with Tito’s Yugoslavia... Kennan’s strategy looked to the possibility of working with 
rather than against them to contain the Soviet Union.”8 Thus, Nixon’s strategy can be viewed as a
mixture of old and new, blending Kennan-era strategy with the new means and limits of 
American foreign policy. 
Secondly, historians assert that regionalism was a key component of Nixon’s grand 
strategy. With the United States not being  able to shoulder direct military involvement in certain 
parts of the globe, the Nixon Administration sought to strengthen local allies in geopolitically 
significant regions. As articulated in the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, the United States would 
continue to provide military assistance to its allies while lessening direct intervention on their 
behalf.9 Robert Litwak provides a framework for this regionalism, and asserts that “American 
post-Vietnam foreign policy was premised upon the belief that the establishment of a new 
relationship with the United States’ great-power rivals would create the favorable political 
atmosphere so as to facilitate the orderly devolution of American power to incipient regional 
powers.”10 In Hard Line, Colin Dueck agrees, saying that “in the context of intense military, 
fiscal, and domestic pressures due to Vietnam, Nixon and Kissinger sought devolution of primary
responsibility away from the United States and towards its allies' own self defense.”11 Dueck 
cites specific instances of this strategy, touching on Iran, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa as being
“regional policemen” which the United States furnished with substantial economic and military 
8  John Lewis Gaddis, “The Evolution of Containment,” in Containing the Soviet Union, (Lincoln: Potomac Books, 
1987), 4.
9 Richard M. Nixon, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon: Containing the Public 
Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, (Washington: Office of the Federal Register, National 
Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, 1971), 544-556.
10 Robert S. Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-
1976, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 54.
11 Colin Dueck, Hard Line: The Republican Party and US Foreign Policy Since World War II, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010), 157.
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aid.12 Odd Arne Westad concurs with the ‘policemen’ metaphor, going further to claim that these 
states were often authoritarian in nature.13 For historians of American Cold War diplomacy, 
‘distance’ replaced ‘intervention’ as the watchword for international affairs. In the context of 
regionalism, Nixon-era strategists saw Yugoslavia  as a potential policeman in the Balkan region.
With its location on NATO’s southern flank, its border with the Adriatic Sea, and its status as the 
only independent socialist state in the Balkans, Yugoslavia was geopolitically invaluable to 
American grand strategy. As will be addressed, the Nixon Administration had to use aid short of 
military means to advance its goal of making Yugoslavia a ‘regional policeman.’
Taking the two concepts of pragmatism and regionalism as effective summations of 
Nixon-era grand strategy, it is easy to see where Yugoslavia fits in. Internationally, the country 
was surrounded by hostile members of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. On the domestic front, the 
country was beset with economic and political strife which were chipping away at Tito’s regime. 
In this situation, an economically weak Yugoslavia was slipping into the sort of internal strife 
which the Soviet Union could easily exploit. With Moscow becoming more bold in its moves 
against ‘revisionist’ communist states in Eastern Europe, Warsaw Pact action against Yugoslavia 
seemed more imminent now than it had since the end of World War II. Any Soviet aggression in 
this direction would greatly shift the balance of power in Europe, and the Nixon Administration 
resolved to not sit by idly.
Conceptual Interest in Aid to Yugoslavia
Yugoslav national security was of primary interest to the United States as a bulwark 
against Soviet influence in the Balkans. Despite being communist, Yugoslavia was a thorn in the 
Soviets’ side since the Tito-Stalin Split of 1948. In this dispute, Tito refused to accept Soviet 
12 Dueck, Hard Line: The Republican Party and US Foreign Policy Since World War II, 157.
13 Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: a World History (London: Penguin Random House UK, 2018), 197.
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leadership of worldwide revolution, and after a period of great personal hostility between the two
socialist leaders, Stalin had the Balkan upstart ejected from the Comintern. From that point on, 
Tito proclaimed that Yugoslavia would remain independent from the Eastern Bloc, which 
naturally put it at odds with Soviet interests in the Balkans.14 For the Stalinists in the Kremlin, 
the existence of a non-Soviet path to socialism was a direct challenge to their leadership among 
the world’s communist nations. According to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, “Stalin
was quite right in worrying about the disruptive example it established for other countries in 
Eastern Europe.”15  Tito’s independent stance “became part of the communist catalogue of 
cardinal sins,” historian William Kintner writes, “and in Stalin’s scheme, there was only one way
to communism- the way of the Soviet Union.”16 
Recent Soviet adventurism in Eastern Europe was a source of concern for many 
American policymakers, who feared that Moscow was taking a more aggressive posture in the 
region.  In 1968, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev ordered the Warsaw Pact to crush the Prague 
Spring movement in Czechoslovakia. The Soviets maintained that the Pact’s intervention was 
intended “to defend the socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people.”17 This justification came to 
be known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, and the precedent it set alarmed independent communist 
regimes around the globe. Yugoslavia joined Romania and China in denunciations of the Soviet 
invasion, with Tito declaring before the League of Communists Yugoslavia (LCY) “that the 
principles of non interventionism, independence, and integrity must be valid for all countries, 
whether they be communist or not.”18 At the Ninth LCY Congress in 1969, Tito further 
14 Josip Broz. Tito and Henry M. Christman, The Essential Tito, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1970), 155.
15 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, (New York: Simon & Schuster Trade Paperbacks, 2011), 929.
16 William Roscoe Kintner and Wolfgang Klaiber, Eastern Europe and European Security, (New York: Dunellen, 
1971), 10.
17 Sergei Kovalev, “The International Obligations of Socialist Countries,” September 25, 1968. Pravda, 26 
September 1968, p. 4.
18 Tito, The Essential Tito, 154
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denounced “the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the theory of ‘limited sovereignty’ of socialist 
states, and [Soviet] plans to reconstitute a single ‘international guiding center’ with a single line 
for the communist movement.”19 Brezhnev had thus tarnished the goodwill which the previous 
premier, Nikita Khrushchev, had spent years trying to cultivate.20 The old Tito-Stalin split was re-
invigorated, this time without Stalin. Despite appearing tough on the world stage, Tito’s 
denunciations were fueled by a fear that the Soviets would use the Brezhnev Doctrine to justify 
an invasion of Yugoslavia. The State Department affirmed that Yugoslav attitudes towards the 
Soviets at this juncture were “characterized by caution and a pragmatism stemming from lack of 
faith in Soviet leaders, whom the Yugoslavs consider unpredictable.”21 In the middle of this 
international disturbance, the National Security Council saw the United States’ potential to turn 
the tables on the Soviets, reporting that what happened in Czechoslovakia had “significantly 
broadened the possibilities for meaningful bilateral exchange” between the United States and 
Yugoslavia.22 
From the West’s perspective, Yugoslavia began to make real commitments to ensure that 
such an intervention would not occur in their country. The Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) took 
the first step, adopting a new military doctrine known as ‘Total People’s Defense,’ which drew 
on tactics its army had developed during World War II.23 Its focus was to train regional units of 
armed civilians to coordinate guerilla operations with the JNA to repel an enemy invasion. The 
RAND Corporation concluded that Total People’s Defense was explicitly directed against the 
19 Ninth Party Congress Reaffirms Liberal and Independent Path, March 20, 1969, Box 733, NSC Country Files- 
Europe, Yugoslavia Volume I; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
20 Central Intelligence Agency, “Yugoslav-Soviet Relations,” April 23 1968,
21 State Department Report on Soviet- Yugoslav Relations April 1969, Box 733, NSC Country Files- Europe, 
Yugoslavia Volume I; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
22 "Response to National Security Study Memorandum 129," U.S. Department of State, accessed May 15, 2019, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d230.
23 A. Ross Johnson, et al. “In Search of Self Reliance, US Security Assistance to the Third World Under the Nixon 
Doctrine”, (Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, June 1973), 15.
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Soviet Union, and that the JNA was sending a signal to Moscow that “a Czechoslovak-like road 
march into Yugoslavia is not possible [and] that an invasion would have unpredictable 
consequences.”24 Combined with domestic efforts, Yugoslavia continued to probe abroad for 
guarantees of their national security, most frequently from the United States. During a meeting 
between JNA Chief of Staff Viktor Bubanj and American Ambassador William Leonhart, the 
General asked, “what would the U.S. do in case of Soviet attack on Yugoslavia?”25 The 
ambassador provided a rather evasive answer to Bubanj that the United States would not allow 
such an action to go unpunished. Likewise, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs Warren Nutter reported that Yugoslav National Defense Secretary Stane 
Dolincar had told him “Yugoslavia is particularly interested in having good relations with the 
United States,” and is “fully prepared to cooperate with other countries on the basis of mutual 
independence.”26 To the Nixon administration, these conversations showed a desire for American
assistance against the Soviet Union.
Against the backdrop of Soviet animosity, Yugoslavia was experiencing a period of 
domestic upheaval which greatly concerned the United States. At the urging of Edvard Kardelj, 
one of Tito’s closest advisors, the LCY was moving to decentralize the Yugoslav political system.
This meant delegating more power to Yugoslavia’s constituent republics, and away from the 
central government in Belgrade. In light of this, Yugoslavia was moving towards the 
promulgation of a new constitution. At the 9th LCY Congress, held in March 1969, the delegates 
set forth the principles of decentralism and worker’s self-management, which would be the 
24  A. Ross Johnson, “Total National Defense in Yugoslavia” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1971.
25 "Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State March 13, 1970," U.S. Department of 
State, accessed May 15, 2019, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d218.
26  Meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Dolnicar, February 1970, Box 428 NSC Files President’s Trip Files, 
Yugoslavia 1969-1972; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
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cornerstones of a post-Tito political structure.27 Ambassador Leonhart reported that this reform 
movement would have to contend with “(a) Presidential succession for which no precedent in 
post-war Yugoslavia exists; (b) Restructuring of its federal system, bound to embroil regional 
rivalries and ethnic animosities; (c) An uncontrolled inflationary spiral and a continuing 
stabilization crisis.”28 In response, the State Department issued a memo to President Nixon, in 
which it stated that “Yugoslavia is undergoing a critical period of basic political and economic 
reform. For urgent domestic and foreign considerations, it must succeed in the course of reform it
has undertaken. We are convinced that its achievement will have consequences for both the 
capitalist and communist worlds.”29 
Yugoslavia’s weak economy caused the most concern for American policymakers as this 
reform phase began. Yugoslavia’s population had increased following World War II.  Still, the 
country remained a largely agrarian economy, as its eight cities with a population over 100,000 
contained “only 9 percent of the country’s population.”30 With an increasing population and 
minimal industry, Yugoslavia was suffering from demand-pull inflation, as aggregate demand for
manufactured goods outpaced how fast they could be produced.31 Yugoslavia sought to redress its
stagnancy through a series of reforms that would reduce the central government’s control on the 
production of goods. Called ‘worker’s self-management,’ this plan would place product quotas, 
labor allocation, and price setting in the hands of local worker’s councils instead of Belgrade.32 
27 “Rezolucija IX Kongres SKJ, Socijalistički Razvoj U Jugoslaviji Na Osnovama Samoupravljanje I Zadaci 
Saveza Komunista,” Deveti Kongres Skj — Elementi Federalizacija Partije, March 1969.
28 "Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State February 17, 1971," U.S. Department of 
State, accessed May 15, 2019, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d223.
29  "Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State February 17, 1971."
30 Wayne S. Vucinich, Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1969), 89.
31 James Chen, "Demand-Pull Inflation," Investopedia, April 08, 2019, accessed May 15, 2019, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/demandpullinflation.asp
32 James H. Seroka, “Prospects for Stability in Post Tito Yugoslavia”, Slavic Review Vol. 37, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), pp.
268-282, 272.
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Tito realized that if the economic and political form were to succeed, “we must offer incentive to 
foreign and internal business ties.”33 As such, Tito instructed Toma Granfil, a member of 
Yugoslavia’s executive council, to indicate to Ambassador Leonhart that American economic aid 
would “contribute to a smooth change of government organization and economic policies.”34 
Thus, the Yugoslavs’ general goal was to attract foreign capital to assist in this transition to a 
decentralized economy. More foreign investment financing from both Yugoslav and foreign firms
would alleviate the financial burdens Belgrade faced during this process. The West viewed these 
developments positively and took them to mean that Yugoslavia was “discarding some of the 
more doctrinaire tenets of communism in favor of a freer, more open system,” according to one 
CIA report.35 Similarly, the RAND Corporation reported to the State Department that “the goal of
the latest stage of economic reform is to ensure continued economic and social development by 
further modernizing the Yugoslav economy, increasing its productivity and orienting it more 
toward world markets.”36
To the Nixon administration, an underdeveloped, fracturing Yugoslavia meant that the 
country was likely to succumb to economic, political, and perhaps even military pressure from 
the Soviet Union. Within this context, Yugoslavia acquired new significance in America’s 
European strategy. Firstly, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia had exacerbated 
fractures already apparent within the Communist world, upsetting commonly held perceptions of
international communism as monolithic.37 Moreover, the invasion had raised the prospect that the
33 Tito, The Essential Tito, 186.
34 “Memorandum for Mr. David Mark, Subject: Yugoslavia,” Central Intelligence Agency, February 26, 1971, 
Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, 5.
35  “Memorandum for Mr. David Mark, Subject: Yugoslavia,” Central Intelligence Agency, July 13, 1971, Freedom 
of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, 3.
36 A. Ross Johnson and Arnold L. Horelick, “Communist Political Succession” (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 
Corporation, 1972, 82.
37  Henry Kissinger, White House Years (London: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 127.
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Soviet Union would behave more aggressively towards independent communist regimes around 
the globe, as codified in the Brezhnev Doctrine. Secondly, Nixon’s continuation of detente 
stipulated that the US had to curtail Soviet influence in Eastern Europe through means short of 
naked aggression. Productive engagement with regimes like Tito’s would simultaneously 
strengthen Yugoslavia’s independent position without jeopardizing the balance between the 
United States and the Soviet Union.38 Thirdly, engaging with Yugoslavia was congruous with the 
Nixon Doctrine, which the President pronounced during his speech in Guam.39 With Yugoslavia’s
history of non-compliance with Soviet pressure, many in the Nixon Administration  theorized 
that the country would be a bulwark against the Kremlin’s interests in the Balkans and the 
Adriatic Sea. In this sense, Yugoslavia could serve as one of America’s regional policemen, as 
their interests converged around keeping Soviet influence at bay.
Building a Partnership 
In early 1970, Nixon made tentative moves towards a full-blown foreign aid program 
with Yugoslavia. After a meeting with Tito in Addis Ababa, Secretary of State Rogers sent a 
letter to Kissinger, in which the Secretary informed him that “Tito was somewhat critical at the 
slowness of U.S. firms in responding to projects for joint industrial ventures in Yugoslavia.”40 
Kissinger then relayed this information to President Nixon on February 12, 1970. Nixon 
underlined Tito’s criticism and made a note to Kissinger, writing, “K—I am very much in favor 
38 Douglas E. Selvage, “Transforming the Soviet Sphere of Influence? U.S.-Soviet Détente and Eastern Europe,” 
1969-1976, Diplomatic History, Vol. 33, No. 4 (September 2009), pp. 671-687, 678. 
39 Richard M. Nixon, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon: Containing the Public 
Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President (Washington: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives
and Records Service, General Services Administration, 1971), 544-556. Note: Though Yugoslavia was not 
mentioned in this speech, the general framework of the Nixon Doctrine was still applied in Washington’s dealings 
with Belgrade.
40 "Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, 
February 12, 1970," U.S. Department of State, accessed May 15, 2019, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1969-76v29/d217.
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of exploiting this in Yugoslavia fully. If it works there, it might be the device by which we can 
work with Rumania & other E. European countries. Can we get a report from Stans & Kearns on 
this?—Get some steam behind it.”41 
The American Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), chaired by Henry Kearns, was 
instrumental in the early stages of Nixon’s Yugoslav aid plan.  In an April 2, 1970 memo to 
Nixon, Rogers asserted that “many firms will not consider investment in developing countries 
unless insurances and guarantees are available.”42 To alleviate this, Rogers stated that “the most 
effective steps we could now take to promote private investment in Yugoslavia would be to 
provide OPIC investment insurance and guarantees” in addition to “having the Eximbank 
participate to the fullest extent possible in covering the elements of an investment project which 
it can finance.”43 OPIC wasn’t able to furnish such aid at the moment, per Section 620 (f) of its 
charter, but Eximbank was subject to no such restrictions. Nixon approved of Rogers’ 
recommendation to seek Eximbank support for investments in Yugoslavia, as well as endorsing 
the amending of OPIC’s restrictive aid policies. Kearns replied to Nixon that “as a developing 
country with favorable prospects of economic growth and expanded trade with the West, 
Yugoslavia represents an attractive field for increasing export sales of US capital goods,” and 
that the Eximbank would “undertake whatever additional business the Bank is able to reasonably
accommodate.”44
41 "Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, 
February 12, 1970,"
42 Measures to Promote Investment in Yugoslavia, April 2 1970, Yugoslavia Volume I, Box 733, NSC Country 
Files- Europe; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
43 Measures to Promote Investment in Yugoslavia, April 2 1970, Yugoslavia Volume I, Box 733, NSC Country 
Files- Europe; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
44 Letter from Henry Kearns to Henry Kissinger on US Private Investment In Yugoslavia, March 30, 1970, 
Yugoslavia Volume I, Box 733, NSC Country Files- Europe; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, 
Yorba Linda, California.
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With the President’s support, Eximbank would be able to provide monetary guarantees, 
lines of credit, and loans to firms based in Yugoslavia. In terms of operating procedure, the Bank 
would extend credit to Yugoslav entities, who would then purchase the goods they needed from 
American companies. Kearns visited Yugoslavia in September of 1970 to meet with the country’s
Deputy Federal Secretary for Finance, Ante Zelic, to begin negotiations for Eximbank financing 
on crucial projects. Zelic stated he found the meeting satisfactory, and that “Mr. Kearns’ visit had
signalled a new era in relationships between the two countries.”45
Sending American economic aid to Yugoslavia would serve three purposes. Self-
evidently, it would provide Yugoslav firms with the financing they needed. As Yugoslavia sought
to reduce the central government’s role in managing the economy, key industries like energy, 
transportation, and manufacturing would need new lines of credit to stay in operation. Secondly, 
economic aid would greatly improve relations between Yugoslavia and the United States, shoring
up a friendly relationship in a geopolitically vital area of Europe. Thirdly, aid would signal to the 
Soviet Union that the United States had long term interests in the viability of an economically 
strong Yugoslavia.
The United States would have to play a delicate balancing act in its dealings with 
Yugoslavia. It is important to note that the United States at no point was seeking to draw 
Yugoslavia into a formal alliance. As such, the former wished to avoid giving the latter any 
notion of such a development. Simultaneously, the United States wanted to aid Yugoslavia just 
enough to maintain friendly relations with them. Kissinger characterized the precarious balance 
between aid and commitment to Yugoslavia, writing, “if we approach too closely they will have 
to move away, as we distance ourselves, they will have to move toward us, that is the almost 
45 Memorandum of Conversation Between Ante Zelic and Henry Kearns, September 4, 1970, Yugoslavia Volume I,
Box 733, NSC Country Files- Europe; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
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physical law of nonalignment.”46 The other actor which the United States had to consider was the
Soviet Union. Should the Soviets perceive closer ties between Yugoslavia and the United States 
to be threatening, Nixon and Kissinger’s detente project could be in jeopardy. Thus, military aid 
was determined to be unsuitable for American-Yugoslav dealings. The National Security Council 
Ad Hoc Group for Yugoslavia concluded that “the Soviet Union might view military support to 
Yugoslavia strictly in the terms in which it is given, or it might interpret this as implying an even 
greater commitment. Either interpretation could act as a deterrent to overt Soviet military threat 
against Yugoslavia, or it could elicit overreaction by the USSR.”47 Jeopardizing the American 
detente with the Soviets over an aid program to Yugoslavia would simply be counter-intuitive.
The year 1970 was crucial for Eximbank investment in Yugoslavia. Although the aid in 
this early stage was small  compared to later years, the credit extended by Eximbank to 
Yugoslavia set the precedent for continued, expanded economic ties between the two states. By 
the end of the 1970 fiscal year, Eximbank announced that it had granted $5,245,037 in total 
credits to Yugoslav firms.48 This included $1,187,687 to Jugoslovenski Aerotransport, $321,875 
to the Yugoslav Bank for Foreign Trade, and $3,735,475 to Zeleznicko Transportno Preduzece 
(Zeleznicke Public Transport Company).49 According to a memo which Kearns sent to Kissinger 
that year, the credits covered an expected export value of $29,000,000.50 In addition to credits, 
Eximbank subsidized several Yugoslav infrastructure projects with $10,712,593 in guarantees, 
46 Kissinger, White House Years, 920.
47"Response to National Security Study Memorandum 129, September 13, 1971," U.S. Department of State, , 
accessed May 15, 2019, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d230.
48 Export-Import Bank of the United States Fiscal Year Report 1970, FG 112, Box 2, White House Central Files 
[EX]; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California. Note: Numbers are not adjusted for
inflation. They reflect the real amount of money as it was valued that year. 
49 Export-Import Bank of the United States Fiscal Year Report 1970.
50 Letter from Henry Kearns to Henry Kissinger on Measures to Promote US Investment in Yugoslavia, October 9, 
1970, Yugoslavia Volume II, Box 733, NSC Country Files- Europe; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and 
Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
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providing the firms with much-needed investment security, should the projects run into 
problems.51 These projects included funding a petrochemical plant constructed by Industrija 
Nafte and a coke oven battery built with parts bought from the US-based Koppers Company.52 
The Yugoslavs responded to the aid package with great favor, and the investment projects sent a 
strong signal that the Nixon administration was willing to assist their restructuring process. 
Kissinger reported that he had a successful meeting with Deputy Foreign Secretary Anton 
Vratusa, during which the latter conveyed that “Yugoslavia is deeply engaged in resolving basic 
questions of its society to increase stability, strength, and cohesion for the future. This includes 
economic issues on which [we] are encouraged to count on the understanding and support of the 
US.” 53 Continued American investments, Vratusa stated, “will strengthen the independent 
position of Yugoslavia.”54 
In tandem with promoting the growth of the Yugoslav industrial base, Nixon sought to 
engage in expanded dialogues with Tito himself. This would allow the two leaders to exchange 
ideas for further economic engagement, and clearly indicate a high-level US commitment to 
Yugoslavia’s independence. In July of 1969, Yugoslav foreign minister Mirko Popovic invited 
Nixon to make an official visit to the country.55 The President accepted the offer, and scheduled 
the trip to take place from September 30 to October 2 the following year. Nixon’s trip to 
51 Export-Import Bank of the United States Fiscal Year Report 1970.
52 Measures to Promote Investment in Yugoslavia, September 4, 1970, Yugoslavia Volume I, Box 733, NSC 
Country Files- Europe; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
53 Dr. Kissinger’s Meeting January 26 with Yugoslav Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs Anton Vratusa and 
Ambassador Bogdan Crnobrnja, January 28 1971, Yugoslavia Volume III, Box 734, NSC Country Files- Europe; 
Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
54  Dr. Kissinger’s Meeting January 26 with Yugoslav Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs Anton Vratusa and 
Ambassador Bogdan Crnobrnja.
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Yugoslavia in 1970 was the first time an American president visited the country, and it 
“highlighted US interest in Yugoslavia, visibly demonstrated the mutual goodwill existing in 
both countries, and gave impetus to succeeding high-level bilateral exchanges and 
consultations.”56 Kissinger viewed the visit as “a quite substantial statement of our approach to 
world affairs,” as it was an early indication of Nixon’s interest “in an evolution in Eastern Europe
(and the USSR) which permits a genuine normalization of East-West relations in Europe.”57 
Nixon’s primary objectives for the trip were to “establish effective personal contact with Tito,” 
“indicate [our] continued interest in Yugoslaviaʼs progress while accepting its idiosyncratic 
position,” and “stress your non-acceptance of the Brezhnev doctrine or other rigid ‘spheres-of-
influence’ concepts.”58  
The October 1, 1970 meeting between Nixon and Tito covered a wide array of topics, 
including the situations in Vietnam, the Middle East, and Algeria. Turning to economic matters, 
Nixon affirmed that “the US wishes to develop patterns of trade with EE (Eastern European) 
countries because of its interest in all forms of communication with Yugoslavia and other EE 
countries. The US believes that the more trade there is with EE countries, the less tension there 
will be between these countries and the US.”59 Finally, Nixon emphasized that “Yugoslavia has 
shown the US the way in which [we] can have profitable trading relations with socialist states 
despite the difference in social systems,” and as such the United States would continue to support
56 NSC Under Secretaries Committee Report on Current US-Yugoslav Relations, May 18, 1973, Yugoslavia 
Volume III, Box 734 NSC Country Files- Europe; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, 
California.
57 "Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, 
1970," U.S. Department of State, accessed May 15, 2019, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-
76v29/d220.
58 "Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, 
1970.". Note: Nixon placed particular emphasis on these two points, as evidenced by the fact that he underlined 
them in the document. 
59 "Memorandum of Conversation, October 1, 1970," U.S. Department of State, accessed May 15, 2019, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d221.
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“Titoʼs leadership in bridging the gap between the two blocs.”60 Upon returning from his trip, 
Nixon announced to Congress that the meeting “broadened our ties of cooperation on the basis of
mutual interest and a matured respect for our acknowledged differences.”61 Concerning the 
growing economic ties stimulated by Eximbank financing, Nixon added that “our trade with 
Yugoslavia increased by over one third in 1970. The US Export-Import Bank reached agreements
with Yugoslavia to increase credit, and extended a loan for Yugoslav purchase of commercial jet 
aircraft in this country.”62 The President concluded by expressing his hope that such exchanges 
would help to open up greater cooperation with Eastern Europe.
Nixon’s meeting with Tito in 1970 set the tone for American aid to Yugoslavia in 1971. 
Just as political ties between the two countries were deepening, this was the case with their 
economic ties as well. Kearns wrote to Kissinger that as early as January  8, 1971, Yugoslav 
firms were soliciting conditional preliminary loans on American-owned goods with a total export
value of $197,676,000.63 While not all of these loans solicited would go through, this amount 
was demonstrative of the high demand for American goods in Yugoslavia. In 1970, Eximbank 
had issued $5,245,037 in credits to Yugoslav firms, and by July 30, 1971, that amount had gone 
up to $33,991,037.64 Hemijska Industrija Pancevo was the largest recipient of aid that year, 
receiving $17,865,000 in credits towards the construction of a new petrochemical complex in 
60  "Memorandum of Conversation, October 1, 1970."
61 The President’s Foreign Policy Report to Congress, February 25, 1971, Country File 169 Yugoslavia, Box 86, 
White House Central Files Subject Files Countries [Gen], Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba 
Linda, California.
62 The President’s Foreign Policy Report to Congress, February 25, 1971..
63 Measures to Promote Investment in Yugoslavia, January 8, 1971, Eximbank FG 112, Box 2, White House 
Central Files [EX]; White House Central Files Subject Files Countries [Gen], Richard Nixon Presidential Library 
and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
64 Export Import Bank of the United States Authorizations in Support of Exports to Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia Volume
IV, Box 734, NSC Country Files- Europe, White House Central Files Subject Files Countries [Gen]; Richard Nixon 
Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
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Pančevo.65 Other major investments covered the purchase of several new DC-9 jet aircraft for 
Jugoslovenski Aerotransport, materials for an Iskra-Elektromehanika electronics factory, and 
American-made oil refining equipment for Industrija Nafte.66  At the end of the third fiscal 
quarter in October 1971, Kearns reported that total Eximbank credits issued to Yugoslav firms 
was $43,668,000.67 In one fiscal quarter alone, the amount of credits issued by Eximbank to 
Yugoslavia had grown by about double the amount issued in 1970.  
As mentioned, the primary focus of Nixon’s aid policy was to expedite Yugoslavia’s 
economic restructuring during its reform phase, such that the country would survive after Tito. 
For some time, individuals like Leonhart and Rogers had asserted Tito was Yugoslavia’s primary 
rallying point, as he was a living representation of the country’s resistance to Nazi and Soviet 
aggression. Despite his strength as a symbol, Tito was not immortal. Former Ambassador to 
Yugoslavia George F. Kennan remarked to Kissinger that Tito was a “choleric, overstrained, 80-
year old man” whose death would likely be a pretext for “serious internal disarray in 
Yugoslavia.”68 The Nixon Administration  reasoned that a disintegrating Yugoslavia would create
conditions that Moscow would exploit, and from this, establish a permanent Soviet presence on 
the Adriatic. With this in mind, Nixon directed Kissinger to issue a National Security Study 
Memorandum (NSSM 129) to “evaluate possible developments in Yugoslavia following Tito’s 
departure.”69 On September 13, 1971, the NSC Interdepartmental Ad Hoc Group for Yugoslavia 
65 Export-Import Bank Fiscal Year Report 1971, Eximbank FG 112, Box 7, White House Central Files [EX]; 
Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
66 Export-Import Bank Fiscal Year Report 1971.
67 Letter from Henry Kearns to Henry Kissinger on Measures to Promote Investment in Yugoslavia, Kearns to 
Kissinger, October 13, 1971, Yugoslavia Volume III, Box 734, NSC Country Files- Europe, Richard Nixon 
Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
68 Letter to Henry Kissinger from George Kennan, April 21, 1973, Country  File Yugoslavia, Box 88, White House 
Central Files [EX], Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
69 NSSM 129, June 15, 1971, SRG Meeting Yugoslavia 10/27/1971, Box H-028, NSC Institutional (“H”) Files, 
Meeting Files (1969-1974); Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
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replied to Kissinger’s request for such a study. The Group’s major premise was that “the United 
States and its Western allies have an important stake in an independent, economically viable, and
non-aligned but Western-looking Yugoslavia,” citing its geographical location as a ‘wedge’ 
between Europe’s power blocs. 70 The Group postulated that “the future course of events in 
Europe will be influenced by the men who succeed Tito, and the men who will be watching from
Moscow assess US intentions.”71 It recommended the United States continue its present aid 
policy to Yugoslavia, and that the President should reschedule the country’s debt repayments on 
PL 480 loans, press Congress to exempt the country from restrictions on PL 480 aid, and amend 
the OPIC charter to allow the corporation to operate there.72 These measures were necessary 
during this period of reform, the Group asserted, as “the success of President Titoʼs federal 
solution will depend in large measure on a stable economy.”73 
As the response to NSSM 129 had advised, Nixon agreed to reschedule payment on the 
debts Yugoslavia had accrued under PL 480. Rogers argued that debt rescheduling would “signal 
to the Yugoslavs, Eastern Europeans, and the Soviets the importance we place on the success of 
the Yugoslav experiment.”74 Kissinger agreed with this recommendation, writing that this “would
help Yugoslavia over a severe balance of payments crisis by increasing [their] reserves from the 
present dangerously low level.  In turn, this would assist her economic stabilization program and 
70 NSSM 129, June 15, 1971, SRG Meeting Yugoslavia 10/27/1971, Box H-028, NSC Institutional (“H”) Files, 
Meeting Files (1969-1974); Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
 NSSM 129, June 15, 1971, SRG Meeting Yugoslavia 10/27/1971, Box H-028, NSC Institutional (“H”) Files, 
Meeting Files (1969-1974); Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
71 Statement of US Interest in Yugoslavia, SRG Meeting Yugoslavia 10/27/1971, Box H-028, NSC Institutional 
(“H”) Files, Meeting Files (1969-1974); Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
72 US Policy and Post-Tito Yugoslavia, September 13, 1971, SRG Meeting Yugoslavia 10/27/1971, Box H-028, 
NSC Institutional (“H”) Files, Meeting Files (1969-1974); Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba 
Linda, California.
73 US Policy and Post-Tito Yugoslavia.
74 Financial Assistance to Yugoslavia, April 21, 1971, Yugoslavia Volume II, Box 733, NSC Country Files- Europe;
Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
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thereby allow her to continue the economic reforms.”75 Nixon approved the recommendation of 
his two aides, postponing the $59,000,000 debt to a ten-year payment plan set to begin in 1973.
Nixon also sought to amend the restrictions on OPIC enterprise in Yugoslavia. While 
Eximbank activities up to this point had focused on providing Yugoslav firms with lines of credit
to buy American goods, OPIC would work to insure American firms doing business in 
Yugoslavia. As previously mentioned, OPIC was not permitted to do business in Yugoslavia, but 
Nixon wanted to change this. The NSC concluded that if the President amended these 
restrictions, “direct US investments in Yugoslavia could rise dramatically from their present level
of $159,000.”76 Kissinger wrote a similar memo to the President. He argued that Eximbank 
would be able to operate more effectively in Yugoslavia if “the US government consider[ed] 
investment guarantees and insurance facilities for private equity investments in Yugoslavia.”77 
Taking Kearns’ and Kissinger’s recommendations, Nixon authorized Kissinger to seek 
“Congressional action to eliminate present legislative restrictions on the issuance of investment 
guarantees and insurance for projects in Yugoslavia.”78 On Nixon’s orders, Under Secretary of 
State for Economic Affairs, Nathaniel Samuels wrote to Senator Jacob Javits, a member of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Samuels stated, “as a director of OPIC, I believe that the 
extension of OPIC programs to Yugoslavia and Romania should expand American investment 
measurably, thereby strengthening our commercial and official ties with these important 
75 Financial Assistance to Yugoslavia, May 3, 1971. Yugoslavia Volume II, Box 733, NSC Country Files- Europe;  
Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
76 US Policy and Post Tito Yugoslavia, September 13, 1971. Yugoslavia Volume II, Box 733, NSC Country Files- 
Europe;  Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
77 Encouragement of US Investment in Yugoslavia, May 7, 1970, Yugoslavia Volume I, Box 733, NSC Country 
Files- Europe;  Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
78 Measures to Promote Investment In Yugoslavia, April 2, 1970,  Yugoslavia Volume I, Box 733, NSC Country 
Files- Europe;  Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
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countries.”79 Javits expressed his approval of the plan and sent a draft of the proposed 
amendment to Nixon. The resulting ‘Javits Amendment’ to the Foreign Relations Act of 1961 
stated that OPIC would be authorized to work in a nation if the President “determines that the 
operation of such programs in a particular country is important to the national interest.”80 The bill
passed just as the year closed out, and OPIC’s president, Bradford Mills, wrote to Nixon that “the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, enacted January 25, 1972, contains an amendment...which 
removes all legal restrictions from the operations in Yugoslavia.”81 With the OPIC charter 
amended, Nixon signed a presidential determination on March 16, 1972, which deemed 
insurance for American firms in Yugoslavia to be in the national security interest of the United 
States.82 
Nixon invited Tito to visit the United States on October 28, 1971. Foreign Secretary 
Mirko Tepavac conveyed to Leonhart that the difficulty of fixing a date had come about as a 
result of “new constitutional amendments for collective presidency” and “a major reshuffle of 
senior government and party posts.”83 Moreover, this visit came on the heels of Leonid 
Brezhnev's trip to Belgrade. Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States, Bogdan Crnobrnja, 
remarked to Kissinger that the reason Brezhnev visited on such short notice had been “because 
of Yugoslaviaʼs opening to China and its improved relations with the US, as well as the 
79 Letter from Nathaniel Samuels to Senator Jacob Javits, Yugoslavia Volume III, Box 734, NSC Country Files- 
Europe; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
80 Establishment of OPIC Programs in Yugoslavia and Romania, Yugoslavia Volume III, Box 734 NSC Country 
Files Europe; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
81 OPIC’s Programs for Yugoslavia and Romania, January 28, 1972, Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
March 1969- February 1974, Box 368, NSC Subject Files; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba 
Linda, California.
82 Presidential Determination Authorizing OPIC Operations in Yugoslavia, March 16, 1972, Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation March 1969-February 74, Box 368, NSC Subject Files; Richard Nixon Presidential Library 
and Museum, Yorba Linda, California. 
83  Presidential Determination Authorizing OPIC Operations in Yugoslavia.
22
Voces Novae, Vol. 12 [2020], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/vocesnovae/vol12/iss1/3
23
Romanians and Albanians.”84 In their meeting, Tito and Nixon conversed about Brezhnev's visit 
to Belgrade. Tito stated that “while earlier the Soviets would not have been at all happy about his
going to the United States, now not only had they raised no objection but Brezhnev had also 
asked that the Soviet desire for good relations with the U.S. be conveyed to the President. This 
was also a sign of change in the Soviet policy.”85 This amounted to Soviet moderation in the face 
of greater Yugoslav-American cooperation, both through diplomatic exchanges and increased 
economic ties. Overall, Tito had stated the meeting with Brezhnev had been positive, and “that 
the USSR and Yugoslavia were dealing with each other as two sovereign states and that 
Yugoslavia had the right to develop its own social system.”86
Nixon assured Tito that the United States was working very hard to promote investment 
in his country, and “if President Tito could influence other socialist states to make arrangements 
similar to those in Yugoslavia, trade with those states would go up.”87 When the meeting 
concluded, Tito expressed satisfaction with the conversation, remarking that all people of 
Yugoslavia “wanted good relations with the United States, relations which had been a tradition in
the history of both countries, and also as good as possible relations with other great powers.”88 
The two leaders’ joint communique issued following the meeting was the result of two years’ 
worth of delicate diplomacy. In the statement, the two leaders affirmed that  friendly relations 
between their countries were “not only in the interest of the peoples of their two countries but 
constituted a significant factor for stability and peace in Europe and elsewhere in the world.”89 
84"Memorandum for the Record, September 13, 1971," U.S. Department of State, accessed May 15, 2019, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d231.
85 "Memorandum for the Presidentʼs File, October 28, 1971," U.S. Department of State, , accessed May 15, 2019, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d232.
86 "Memorandum for the Presidentʼs File, October 28, 1971.".
87 "Memorandum for the Presidentʼs File, October 28, 1971."
88 "Memorandum for the Presidentʼs File, October 28, 1971."
89 Joint Communique Following Meetings Between the President and Josip Broz Tito President of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, October 30 1971, Yugoslavia Volume III, Box 734, NSC Country Files- Europe; 
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Nixon reported to Congress that the meeting had been a success, as he and Tito “resolved to 
continue our high-level exchanges and to broaden the scope of our economic ties,” and that 
continued friendship was necessary “for peace and stability in Europe, the Mediterranean, and 
the Middle East.”90
The Limits of Non-Alignment
While 1972 was an exceptionally strong period for relations between the United States 
and Yugoslavia, that year also saw the Soviets take a more active role in the Balkans. In a 
striking reversal of Soviet policy, Breznhev’s regime began to seek reconciliation with Tito rather
than confrontation. The combination of Nixon’s 1970 visit to Yugoslavia and the American 
overtures to China had been instrumental in pushing Breznhev to repair relationships with other 
independent communist regimes.91 With those two communist states apparently ‘tilting’ West, the
Soviet Union was inclined to shore up relations with Belgrade rather than antagonize them. 
Malcolm Toon, the new American ambassador to Yugoslavia, reported that over the past year, 
“the Yugoslav-Soviet relationship had warmed up, but as a result of change in Soviet behavior, 
not in Yugoslav behavior.”92Additionally, Stane Dolanc, a member of the Yugoslav Presidium, 
informed Toon that since Breznhev’s visit, “military pressure from Soviets in the Balkans is 
generally at [a] low point,” owed to the “economic as well as inter-Party relations [which] have 
developed steadily since Brezhnev visit.”93 On the one hand, it was a positive development that 
Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California
90 The President’s Foreign Policy Report to Congress, February 9, 1972, Country File 169 Yugoslavia, Box 86, 
White House Central Files Subject Files Countries [Gen]; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba 
Linda, California.
91 "Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Micunovic and Secretary Brezhnev held on August 10, 
1971," August 13, 1971, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), Kabinet 
Predsednika Republike (KPR), fond 837, Foreign visits, I-3-a/101-131 (Brezhnev). Obtained and translated by 
Milorad Lazic. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/175848
92 “Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 15, 1974, 3:09-3:30 P.M.,” U.S. Department of State, 
accessed February 27, 2020, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p1/d67.
93  “Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 15, 1974, 3:09-3:30 P.M.”
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the possibility of intervention by the Soviets had waned. On  the other hand, it was also taken as 
an indicator of greater Soviet influence over Yugoslav politics. The CIA reported that “the 
Soviets have at least temporarily patched up their differences with Tito and are using this 
opening to jockey for better position in the post-Tito Yugoslavia,” adding that “in return for large
development credits, Moscow recently joined the West in gaining the right to bypass federal 
authorities and deal directly with local enterprises.”94 Repeated high-level diplomatic exchanges, 
coupled with joint scientific, economic, and cultural agreements, had proven satisfactory to the 
Yugoslavs, laying “a firm foundation for the further growth of trade.”95 From the perspective of 
the United States, the Soviets were attempting to gain “political leverage to isolate or woo” 
Yugoslavia, expanding their trade ties “enough to make economic manipulation a significant 
policy option for the USSR.”96 Indeed, the Soviets were using methods not unlike the United 
States in this regard, agreeing in 1972 to the sale of surplus petroleum and coke, the granting of 
construction credits for metallurgy facilities, and the lowering of trade barriers between the two 
states.97 Through such actions, the Soviet Union had begun to demonstrate that it was receiving 
the subtle signals the Nixon Administration was sending through economic aid to Yugoslavia. 
Not only had the Soviets sought to cultivate better relations with Tito, but they had also started to
mimic the policy employed by the United States.
94 “Weekly Report,” Central Intelligence Agency, October 13, 1972, Freedom of Information Act Electronic 
Reading Room.
95 “Communique on Talks between Soviet Foreign Ministers ‘in a sincere and friendly atmosphere ’”, February 
1971, collected in Steven Clisson, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973: A Documentary Survey, Royal 
Institute of International Affairs by Oxford University Press (1975), 301.
96 A. Ross Johnson and Arnold L. Horelick, “Communist Political Succession” (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 
Corporation, 1972), 27.
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Still, the Nixon Administration remained doubtful of the Soviet ability not only to repair 
relations through financial ‘carrots’ but also Moscow’s ability to manipulate the country’s 
economy through closer trade relations. In line with Toon’s analysis, the CIA argued that the 
Soviets knew “that there is no longer any pro-Russian faction in the Yugoslav party” and that 
“Moscow also knows better than anyone else that the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement this year is
almost entirely the consequence of initiatives on the Soviet side and not the result of any change 
by Tito.”98 The secondary goal of Soviet economic aid towards Yugoslavia, developing levers 
through which the Soviets could influence policymaking in the country, was also evaluated to be 
minimal, at best. A CIA analysis contended that even with Breznhev’s overtures, “the means 
available to Moscow to further their objectives are in any event quite limited.”99 The Agency 
further contended that “Soviet economic leverage is not great- especially in the view of the 
probable Western willingness to help in times of Yugoslav need- and Moscow has often found it 
to be an ineffective instrument of pressure in any case.”100 In sum, the developments of 1972 
gave rise to a new dynamic in Yugoslavia’s Cold War diplomacy as Belgrade was apparently 
playing both sides to maximize the aid it could get. Content to milk Soviet friendship initiatives 
at face value, the Yugoslavs appeared to have no intention of aligning with their socialist rival in 
the North. Taking money from both sides, however, was perfectly suited to Yugoslav goals.
The American side’s response was not only to maintain American aid to Yugoslavia, but 
to increase it. Total Eximbank credits in Yugoslavia continued their upward trend in 1972, with 
the Bank issuing $48,942,523 in total credits to several Yugoslav firms.101 These credits included 
98 “Memorandum: Tito’s Time of Troubles,” Central Intelligence Agency, November 17, 1972, Freedom of 
Information Act Electronic Reading Room.
99 “Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal, Response to NSSM 129,” Office of National Estimates, Central 
Intelligence Agency, July 27, 1971, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room.
100 “Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal, Response to NSSM 129.”
101 “Fiscal Year-End Report - Export-Import Bank of the United States, FY1972,” Export-Import Bank of the 
United States, (Washington DC, 1972), 42-43.
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funding for electronics equipment, the construction of a rolling mill plant in Smederevo, a 
multitude of electric locomotives, and six DC-9 jumbo jets for Jugoslovenski Aerotransport.102 
With medium and short term insurance, Eximbank’s total capital investment in Yugoslavia that 
year came to $153,048,694, the highest amount of exposure which the Bank ever invested in 
Yugoslavia.103 
 Compounded with the credits Yugoslavia had received in 1970 and 1971, American 
investment in Yugoslavia was showing concrete returns by 1972. “Pressure on the Yugoslav 
economy has been eased now that a balance of payments crisis has been averted,” the CIA 
reported, “once again the US and other Western nations are providing the necessary assistance by
granting new hard currency credits and by rescheduling existing debt payments.”104 Overall, the 
CIA found that Yugoslavia’s economy was performing markedly better than it had in 1971, as the
gap between the country’s export earnings and its import expenses was closing.105 By every 
metric, the areas of Yugoslav industry which Eximbank most heavily subsidized (mining, 
chemical, textile, and petroleum) were performing better than they had pre-1970.106 That 
considered, Yugoslavia still ran a considerable deficit when it came to its trade balance. By 1972,
its total exports grew to $2.421 billion (up from $1.678 in 1970 when Eximbank began issuing 
credits), but the country spent as much as $3.233 billion on imports.107 While the economy was 
undoubtedly strong, none of these statistics demonstrated that Yugoslavia was any more 
102 “Fiscal Year-End Report - Export-Import Bank of the United States, FY1972,” 42-43.
103 “Export- Import Bank of the United States Authorizations in Yugoslavia, Romania, Russia, and Poland July II 
1974,” White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX CO 169 Yugoslavia, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and 
Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
104  “Intelligence Memorandum- The Yugoslav Economy: Off the Critical List?,” Central Intelligence Agency, 
March 1972, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room.
105“Central Intelligence Bulletin,” Central Intelligence Agency, July 7 1972, Freedom of Information Act 
Electronic Reading Room.
106 “OECD Economic Surveys: Yugoslavia,” Department of Economics and Statistics, Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, April 1975, 51. 
107 “OECD Economic Surveys: Yugoslavia,” 61. 
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economically self-sufficient than it had been in previous years. Rather than foreign investment 
increasing Yugoslavia’s financial independence, the country found itself increasingly beholden to
Western creditors and the markets they represented. 
The trend of high American investment in Yugoslavia continued throughout 1973. That 
year, the Eximbank invested a sum of $119,935,381 in Yugoslavia.108 This investment made it the
fourth-largest recipient of Eximbank financing that year. Of that amount, the majority of this 
funding went to the construction of two steel mills in Zenica, the purchasing of high-end 
equipment for a copper mining facility constructed by Rudarsko-Top Ionicarski Basen, and 
funding for Hemijska Industria’s petrochemical plant in Pancevo.109 Equally important to foreign 
aid, on January 19, 1973, Ambassador Toon and Yugoslav Finance Secretary Janko Smole signed
an agreement that authorized OPIC to begin operations in the country.110 The development was 
nothing less than groundbreaking, as Yugoslavia became the first communist state to receive 
OPIC funding for investment projects. “For more than thirty years Eastern Europe has been 
virtually isolated from US direct investment,” OPIC President Mills stated, “we sincerely hope 
that the bilateral agreement signed in 1973 enabling us to operate in Yugoslavia will prove most 
beneficial for all parties concerned.”111 With a combination of political risk insurance, financing, 
and investment studies, OPIC sought to attract American business investment in Yugoslavia. 
Industrial Flavors and Fragrances (IFF) was the first American firm to sign a joint-ownership 
agreement with Yugoslavia using OPIC insurance, and the Corporation agreed to provide $1.3 
108 “Fiscal Year-End Report - Export-Import Bank of the United States, FY1973,” Export-Import Bank of the 
United States, Washington DC (1973), 51.
109  “Fiscal Year-End Report - Export-Import Bank of the United States, FY1973,” 51.
110Raymond H. Anderson, “U.S. Signs Accord to Help Investment in Yugoslavia,” The New York Times (The New
York Times, January 19, 1973), https://www.nytimes.com/1973/01/19/archives/us-signs-accord-to-help-investment-
in-yugoslavia-us-yugoslavia-sign.html)
111“Investing in Yugoslavia with OPIC Assistance,” Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Indiana University 
Library (1973), i. 
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million in securities for IFF operations. OPIC’s insurance guarantees helped attract firms such as 
Dow Chemical, Chemtex, United Technologies Corporation, and Motorola, which otherwise 
would have been reluctant to invest in an economically uncertain market like Yugoslavia.112 In 
addition to opening up greater markets in service of the American economy, these firms would 
provide the Yugoslavs with new jobs, outlets for the purchase of Western goods, and tax revenue 
for the central government. 
Despite what had been a strong initial relationship between the two countries, by late 
1973, Yugoslav-American relations began to show signs of serious ideological conflict. Indeed, 
the rupture between the two countries threatened to end the Nixon Administration’s aid policy 
with the country during this period. While the United States had agreed to accept Yugoslavia’s 
non-aligned position, for the time being, it was natural that the world’s capitalist superpower 
would experience difficulties working with a staunchly independent socialist regime in the 
Balkans. One of the earliest warnings the Administration received came from George Kennan, 
the father of ‘containment’ and former ambassador to Yugoslavia, who wrote to Kissinger that 
Tito was no “friend” of the United States. 113 In a particularly clairvoyant statement, Kennan 
surmised that Tito “wants to have his cake and eat it too. He wants good bilateral relations with 
us, but he wants also to retain the privilege of commending himself to his African, Arab, and East
Asian friends, not to mention the Russians, by joining in the chorus of attacks on 'American 
imperialism'.”114 At several points in the Nixon presidency, the Yugoslavs had indeed been 
112 John R. Lampe, Russell O. Prickett, and Adamović Ljubiša S., Yugoslav-American Economic Relations since 
World War II, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 131.
113 “Memorandum for Participants in Economic Talks,” White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX CO 169 
Yugoslavia, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
114 “Memorandum for Participants in Economic Talks.”
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critical of US policy in Cambodia, Chile, and Panama. The same could be said for much of the 
world, including those countries which the US considered allies.115 
The outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 was the event that led to the most serious 
crisis in US-Yugoslav relations. Tito had long been a close partner with Egypt in the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM), and he considered its president, Anwar al-Sadat, to be a personal 
ally. When Syria joined Egypt in attacking Israel on October 5th of that year, Belgrade joined 
Moscow in both rhetorical and material support to the aggressors. As Tito stated regarding 
support for the Arab cause: “We are not formally members of the Warsaw Pact. But if the cause 
of socialism, communism, and the working class should be endangered, we shall know where we
stand. We hold our aims in common with the Soviet Union.”116 While opposed to Soviet pressure 
on his own country, Tito could not pass up the opportunity to aid in what was seen as a war of 
national liberation, regardless of which side the Soviets were on. For their part, the Yugoslavs 
provided ammunition and weapons to the Egyptian forces, using the cover of ‘humanitarian aid’ 
to run supply convoys to Cairo.117 American policymakers considered Yugoslavia’s aid to Egypt 
to be in direct conflict with American interests in the region, given the threat which wartime 
arms shipments posed to Israel. This was not simply a point of ideological contention, but an 
apparent challenge to American power in the Eastern Mediterranian. To shore up his position in 
the NAM, Tito appeared to be making a diplomatic about-face, going as far as to denounce the 
American policy towards Israel as imperialist and “gangster'' in nature.Yugoslavia’s Foreign 
115 “Telegram 200523 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia, October 10, 1973, 0120Z,” 
U.S. Department of State, accessed February 27, 2020, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-
76ve15p1/d64.
116 Josip Broz Tito quoted in Neil Barnett, Tito, (London: Haus, 2006), 116.
117 “Talking Points for Meeting with President of the Yugoslav Assembly Peko Dapčević, April 28, 1976,” White 
House Central Files, CO 169: Yugoslavia, Box 60 1976, Ford Library, Ann Arbor. Yugoslavia also had shipped a 
great deal of T-55A tanks to Egypt over the course of the war, as outlined in Charlie Gao, “Meet the T-72MJ: A Tank
with Russian and Western DNA,” The National Interest (The Center for the National Interest, February 3, 2020), 
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/meet-t-72mj-tank-russian-and-western-dna-90306)
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Ministry stood by these claims, affirming that “as long as Arab countries are exposed to 
aggression, Yugoslavia will… provide moral, political, and materiel support, including the 
facilities which the Arab countries request from us.”118 The CIA reported that such conduct “will 
inevitably cause tensions in Yugoslav-US relations. In weighing his commitment to 
nonalignment against relations with Washington, however, [Tito] apparently is confident that 
differences with the US can be solved after the crisis.”119 
The uproar in Washington came swiftly, and the first avenues of pressure against 
Yugoslavia were determined to be economical. Walter Stoessel, the Assistant Secretary of State 
for European affairs, sent a telegram to Kissinger in which he outlined “possible actions which 
we might consider undertaking to induce the Yugoslavs to be more mindful of our interests when
they are contemplating taking ‘non-aligned’ positions in non-European areas.”120 The possible 
responses which Stossel proposed included ending OPIC guarantees for US investments, 
revoking Yugoslavia’s status as a ‘most favored nation’ trading partner, and a general curtailing 
of government credits and loans directed towards Yugoslav industry.121 In short, what Stoessel 
was proposing to Secretary of State Kissinger was a complete withdrawal from the programs 
which Nixon was using to build a partnership with Yugoslavia.122 The Department of Defense 
made the most headway in punishing Yugoslavia, with Secretary James Schlesinger ordering 
“until such time that a determination is made that the Yugoslav Government takes actions which 
118 “Yugoslavia and the War,” Central Intelligence Agency, 1973, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading 
Room.
119 “Yugoslavia and the War,”  Central Intelligence Agency, 1973, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading 
Room.
120 “Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Stoessel) to Secretary of 
State Kissinger, Washington, October 3, 1973,” U.S. Department of State, accessed February 25, 2020, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p1/d63).
121 “Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Stoessel) to Secretary of 
State Kissinger, Washington, October 3, 1973.” 
122 Kissinger held dual roles as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State beginning on September 22, 
1973.
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are compatible with U.S. national security interests, the Secretary directs that all DOD actions 
for closer cooperation with Yugoslavia be suspended.”123 At this juncture, Yugoslav-American 
partnership appeared to be falling apart, and the economic program which Nixon had helped 
initiate hung in the balance.
Amid the conflict in the Middle East, There were still efforts within the Administration to
salvage the US-Yugoslav relationship. On October 10th, Stossel convened a meeting with 
Ambassador Granfil to discuss Yugoslavia’s upsetting actions  amid the crisis in the Middle East.
Unsurprisingly, Granfil reported that “differences between [the] US and Yugoslavia...were 
inevitable,” but added that despite this, relations with the US were “basically good.”124 Moreover,
Yugoslavia’s policies may have run counter to the United States in this instance, but Granfil 
declared that Yugoslav policy was not inherently anti-US. Stoessel recommended that 
Ambassador Toon continue to prod Yugoslav leadership to moderate and explain their position. 
At a meeting with Deputy Federal Secretary Jaksa Petric in Belgrade, Toon urged the Yugoslav 
government to “refrain from statements and actions which could only exacerbate situations 
already fraught with danger and raise international tensions generally,” specifically in regards to 
the current crisis in the Middle East.125 Petric, for his part, moved to assure Toon that “no 
Yugoslav policy or action could be characterized objectively as anti-American; Yugoslav policies
123 “Telegram 200523 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia, October 10, 1973, 
0120Z,”U.S. Department of State, accessed February 25, 2020, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p1/d64)
124 “Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Wickham) to the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hill), Washington, October 17, 1973,” U.S. Department of State (U.S. 
Department of State), accessed February 25, 2020, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p1/
d65.
125 “Memorandum of Conversation, Belgrade, October 19, 1973, 9-9:45 a.m.,” U.S. Department of State, accessed 
February 25, 2020, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p1/d66).
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and actions were cast and implemented in terms of Yugoslavia's national interests which 
admittedly, on occasion, might not coincide with United States national interests.”126 
Despite offering few apologies on account of Yugoslav conduct, Petric managed to clarify
recent Yugoslav actions and explain them within the framework of non-alignment. Instead of 
rebuffing Toon, Petric focused on reiterating Yugoslavia’s continued adherence to the terms 
agreed upon in the 1971 Nixon-Tito Communique.127 This was both a subtle urging for the 
United States to accept an independent Yugoslav foreign policy, but also a tacit affirmation that 
Yugoslavia saw the United States as a partner it did not wish to lose. By November 25th, the 
Yom Kippur War’s combatants had signed a ceasefire, thus eliminating the most contentious 
geopolitical issue between the US and Yugoslavia. Three days later, Toon relayed back to 
Kissinger that his meeting with Petric and Stoessel’s meeting with Granfil had been instrumental 
in clarifying the Yugoslav perspective of its relationship with the United States. “The problem 
has eased somewhat due in part to frequent and frank high-level US-Yugoslav discussions on the 
Middle East,” he informed Kissinger, “with the likely collateral benefit that the Yugoslavs have 
had further indications of the limits of our tolerance when our vital interests are involved.”128
The Kissinger-chaired NSC concluded that “recent instances in which Yugoslav policy 
actions were at odds with a US objective… have their causation in an atmosphere created by the 
Yugoslav leadership's perception of their internal political requirements as the country prepares 
for the difficulties of the Tito succession, and their need to appear a leading member of the non-
126 “Telegram 77815 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia, April 17, 1974, 1726Z,” U.S. 
Department of State, accessed February 25, 2020, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p1/d68).
127 “Telegram 77815 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia, April 17, 1974, 1726Z.”
128 US Department of State, “European Chiefs of Mission Meeting: Personal Assessment by Ambassador: 
Yugoslavia,” November 28, 1973, US Embassy Belgrade, CIA Virtual Reading Room.
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aligned nations.”129 Ambassador Toon was of the same mind, as he suspected that Tito was 
attempting to satiate radicals within his administration, and not intentionally trying to undermine 
American foreign policy. Thus, the NSC judged that the United States would have to ‘put up’ 
with Yugoslav posturing on occasion, as differences in ideology were the price that had to be 
paid for long term cooperation. Summarily, the NSC affirmed that “insofar as US-Yugoslav 
relations are concerned, Yugoslav policy calls for continuing good relations with the US 
especially in the economic area, with energetic private assurances that ideology has only minimal
effects, and in the evident conviction that US goodwill can be counted on.”130 The NSC report 
reiterated that the guiding principle behind US-Yugoslav relations remained a commitment to 
“the continued existence of a stable, independent, non-aligned and economically viable 
Yugoslavia.”131 The NSC Under Secretaries Committee asserted a similar point, stating that 
“[recent] differences should not be allowed to obscure the larger US interest in the continued 
independence and unity of Yugoslavia, particularly at a time when Yugoslavia undergoes the 
stresses and strains of strengthening its institutions in preparation for the inevitable departure of 
Tito from the scene.”132 Rather than reflecting a genuine hostility to US interests abroad, 
Yugoslav officials were attempting to maintain credibility with the non-aligned world (and their 
government) while Tito seemed to be drifting into the West’s influence.
For the time being at least, US-Yugoslav relations had been pulled from disaster. The key 
lesson which the United States drew from this exchange was that dealing with non-aligned 
nations had its limits. As Kissinger wrote concerning the ‘physical nature of non-alignment,’ 
129 “Report on Current Status of US-Yugoslav Relations, 1973,” White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX CO 
169, Yugoslavia, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
130 “Report on Current Status of US-Yugoslav Relations, 1973,” White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX CO 
169, Yugoslavia, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
131  “Report on Current Status of US-Yugoslav Relations, 1973.”
132 “NSC Under Secretaries Committee Subject: US-Yugoslav Relations May 18, 1973,” White House Central 
Files, Subject Files, EX CO 169 Yugoslavia, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
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nations like Yugoslavia would not accept total complicity with superpower foreign policy, 
whether it be Soviet or American. Instead, the United States would have to recognize that in the 
current geopolitical climate, Washington could not expect its nominal allies to unconditionally 
support American grand strategy. As such, there would be no economic penalties placed on 
Yugoslavia, nor would the United States alter its commitment to an independent, economically 
stable, and non-aligned Yugoslavia.  
Conclusion
The year 1974 provides a clear end to Nixon’s ‘opening’ to Yugoslavia. On February 21, 
1974, Yugoslavia adopted its fourth constitution. The decision to reform the nature of the 
Yugoslav state was informed by the desire to achieve a more stable economy, address the 
competing political desires of its constituent republics, and ideally, hold together the delicate 
ethnic balance which Tito helped maintain.133 The resulting document was one of the longest, 
most complex constitutions in European history, commiting above all else to the concept of 
“worker’s self management” which Edvard Karadelj had championed for years.  On August 9th, 
1974, Nixon resigned the office of President of the United States following the cover-up of the 
Watergate break-in. The same day as Nixon’s resignation, Gerald Ford assumed the office of 
President. At least in theory, these large shifts in leadership should have altered the relationship 
between the two countries a fair bit. However, the events of 1974 demonstrated the durability of 
the relationship which Nixon had a hand in crafting. 
Indeed, 1974 continued the trend of favorable US-Yugoslav economic relations. That 
year, Eximbank invested the highest amount of money it had ever committed to Yugoslavia, a 
133 Report on the Final Draft of the SFRY Constitution, Mijalko Todorovic, President of the Federal Assembly and 
Chairman of the Joint Constitutional COmmission of all the Chambers of the Federal Assembly, made at the Session
of the Chamber of Nationalities held on January 22, 1974.
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total of $376.9 million in loans.134 This amount made Yugoslavia the top recipient of Eximbank 
funds for the 1974 fiscal year. Included in this aid package were funds for the construction of a 
copper wire facility in Zenica, the expansion of an aluminum plant in Skopje, and most notably, 
the creation of a nuclear power plant in Krsko, with components purchased from the American 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation.135 As facilitated by Eximbank and OPIC funding, total US-
Yugoslav trade had increased substantially since the beginning of Nixon’s aid program. 
Ambassador Toon sent Kissinger a telegram ahead of the Secretary’s visit to Yugoslavia, wherein
he affirmed that “we are pleased that US-Yugoslav trade is increasing rapidly and that there has 
been gradual growth in joint ventures and industrial cooperation. Both countries desire further 
expansion.”136 While the total value of US-Yugoslav trade had amounted to $264.1 million in 
1970, by 1974, Yugoslav Prime Minister Djemal Bzjedic estimated that it now valued around 
“$650-700 million both ways.”137 Stemming in part from greater American investments, the 
Yugoslav economy appeared to be performing very well. A 1974 OECD analysis of the Yugoslav
economy reported such a development, noting an increase in consumer purchasing power, a rise 
in real wage earnings, and a 10.2 percent improvement in industrial output since the beginning of
the year.138
134 Leo Kuus, “Marketing in Yugoslavia”. US Department of Commerce, Overseas Business Reports. December 
1975. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1; Robert S. Rendell, “Eximbank Assistance to Trade and 
Investment in Eastern Europe,” The International Lawyer, Volume 10, no. 1, (Winter 1975), pp. 79-84, 81.
135 “Fiscal Year-End Report- Export-Import Bank of the United States, FY 1974,” Export-Import Bank of the 
United States, Washington DC (1974), 22; “1974-06-24 EXIM Bank Press Release,” EXIMBANK Digital Archives,
accessed March 23, 2020, https://www.digitalarchives.exim.gov/digital/collection/ExImPR01/id/4568.
136 “Memorandum of Conversation,” November 4, 1974, Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Documents
on Eastern Europe, 1973-1976 ,https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e15/107806.htm.
137 “Memorandum of Conversation, Belgrade, November 4, 1974, 11:32 a.m.-12:05 p.m.,” U.S. Department of 
State, accessed March 23, 2020, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p1/d70; US Congress,
“Reorientation And Commercial Relations Of The Economies Of Eastern Europe: A Compendium Of Papers 
Submitted To The Joint Economic Committee Congress Of The United States,” August 16, 1974, United States 
Senate Virtual Reference Desk, 28.
138 “OECD Report for Yugoslavia April 1974,” “Organization for Economic Development.
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Bilateral relations between the two countries remained stable alongside economic 
trends. In fact, the Yugoslavs had begun to make concerted efforts to ensure that a fracture on the
level of 1973 would not occur again. At a meeting with Ambassador Toon in February 1974, 
Granfil expressed regret for the momentary breach in US-Yugoslav relations, and went on to 
affirm that Tito wanted “no conflict with [the] US.” Additionally, he assured Toon that Tito was 
personally moving to restrain some of the more radical individuals responsible for the crisis in 
the first place, expressing hope there would be no repetition of Yugoslavia's blatant disregard of 
vital US interests. Secretary Kissinger paid a visit to the country in November that year, meeting 
with Prime Minister Bzjedic to discuss US-Yugoslav relations. In Bzjedic’s words, relations 
between the two states were “developing very well in a spirit of friendship,” and that in order to 
redress its economic concerns, Yugoslavia considered the United States “one of the most serious 
partners” in this regard.139 Additionally, President Ford continued to support the strong US-
Yugoslav relationship cultivated by his predecessor, making an official state visit to the country 
in late 1974. Both leaders expressed the current relationship as satisfactory, with President Ford 
being confident enough to state his belief that relations between the two states were 
“excellent.”140 
The continuity between the Nixon and Ford Administrations was best reflected in the 
joint statement issued after the President concluded his meeting with Tito. The resulting August 
4th 1974 statement re-affirmed both American and Yugoslav commitment to the principles of the 
1971 joint statement drafted under the Nixon Administration. Most notably, the statement 
publically reiterated the “steadfast interest of the United States and its support for the 
139 “Memorandum of Conversation, Belgrade, November 4, 1974, 11:32 a.m.-12:05 p.m.,” U.S. Department of 
State, accessed March 23, 2020, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p1/d70
140 “Memorandum of Conversation, Belgrade, August 3, 1975, 7:35-9 p.m.,”  U.S. Department of State, accessed 
March 23, 2020, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p1/d73.
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independence, integrity, and nonaligned position of Yugoslavia.”141 The wording in this section of
the joint statement tread on familiar ground, as these were the same points which the Nixon 
Administration’s NSSM 129 had outlined in 1971. Far from representing a break from the 
Nixon-era strategy towards Yugoslavia, the Ford Administration followed in the footsteps of its 
predecessor, committing itself to a long term partnership which would last the rest of the Cold 
War. 
It is difficult to say whether or not American economic aid was the sole factor in aiding 
Yugoslavia’s economic and political restructuring programs. What is much easier to demonstrate 
is that the aid had a tangible benefit on the country as it entered its reform phase. By every 
metric, the Yugoslav economy was doing better in 1974 than it had in 1969, with American 
investment providing the impetus for growth in key sectors, such as mining, energy, chemical, 
and transportation. The aid which the Nixon Administration furnished to Yugoslavia helped to 
promote trade between the two countries, ease the financial burden on Belgrade, and ultimately, 
integrate the country into global markets. 
In his dealings with Yugoslavia, Nixon had broken the dichotomy established by the Cold
War. Namely, he challenged the assumption that there existed a monolithic communist bloc 
which could have no friendly dealings with the West. Rather than believing in Soviet suzerainty 
over communist Yugoslavia,  Nixon instead chose to exploit fractures in international 
communism to develop a partnership with Tito. While Yugoslavia remained demonstrably 
outside the Soviet sphere of influence, the country did manage to cultivate better relations with 
its large communist neighbor in the north. As both American and Soviet policymakers realized, 
the open statements and demonstrations of US interest in an independent, non-aligned 
141 “Joint Statement Following Talks With President Tito of Yugoslavia.,” Joint Statement Following Talks With 
President Tito of Yugoslavia. | The American Presidency Project, August 4, 1975. 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/joint-statement-following-talks-with-president-tito-yugoslavia.
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Yugoslavia played a crucial role in making this so. At the same time, Yugoslavia never formally 
entered into a conventional alliance with the US, yet this was never a stated goal of the Nixon 
administration. Instead, the US sought to preserve Yugoslavia’s status as a strong leader of the 
Non-Aligned Movement, albeit with a strong inclination towards the West. By this measure, the 
Nixon Administration had achieved its stated goals. Though the path was fraught with 
challenges, inconsistencies, and often contradictions, Nixon helped establish Yugoslavia as a 
reliable American partner in the Balkans for years to come. 
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